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A recent WALL STREET JOURNAL article described the purpose of 
the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act as 
enacted “to pursue the Mafia as a whole, tying the big bosses to the 
crimes of their underlings by claiming they were all part of a ‘criminal 
enterprise.’”
1
 The WALL STREET JOURNAL’s description fairly captures 
Congress’ impetus for passing the expansive RICO statute that gives 
prosecutors a powerful tool
2
 for convicting “insulated ring leaders”
3
 of 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2013, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., Criminal Justice, 2005, University of Illinois at Chicago. The 
author thanks Professor Hal Morris and Jennifer Eseed for their invaluable help and 
encouragement. 
1
 Nathan Koppel, They Call It RICO, and It Is Sweeping, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (Jan. 20, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424052748704881304576094110829882704.html. 
2
 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922–23 
(Statement of Findings and Purpose).  
1
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the mafia. Yet the statute’s extensive scope and accompanying grant of 
broad prosecutorial discretion has been criticized for “expanding the 




In the recent Seventh Circuit RICO conspiracy case, United States 
v. Schiro,
 
the court cast an even wider net by allowing prosecutors to 
convict underlings who rose through the ranks for their roles at various 
positions within the mafia as separate conspiracies.
5
 In holding that 
subordinate branches of the mob are individual and independent 
enterprises, the Seventh Circuit permitted multiple conspiracy 
prosecutions based on essentially the same conduct.
6
 By carving the 
mob’s internal divisions into independent enterprises, the Seventh 
Circuit has broadened the prosecutor’s reach under an already 
expansive RICO statute and chipped away at defendants’ double 
jeopardy protections. 
This Note examines whether the court’s decision in Schiro stems 
from a conscious policy choice favoring Congress’ intent to use RICO 
as a broad tool in the fight against organized crime over the 
constitutional protections of double jeopardy.
7
 Part I explains the 
protections that the double jeopardy clause grants criminal defendants 
and the importance of such protections. Part II examines the RICO 
statute’s purpose and how its structure effectuates that purpose. In Part 
III, the Schiro decision is reviewed. The majority and dissent’s 
divergent conclusions on how to establish the parameters of an 
enterprise are examined: the majority’s attempt to solve the enterprise 
issue via analogy to corporate law is deconstructed and contrasted with 
the dissent’s practical assessment of the actual overlap of the conduct 
charged in each conviction. Finally, this Note concludes that the 
                                                                                                                   
3
Sarah Baumgartel, The Crime of Associating with Criminals? An Argument 
for Extending the Reves “Operation or Management” Test to RICO Conspiracy, 97 




 679 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2012) cert. denied, No. 12-5571, 2012 WL 3155138 
(U.S. Oct. 1, 2012). 
6
 See id. 
7
 See id. 
2
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dissent’s contextual, conduct-based approach results in a more 
accurate portrayal of the defendants’ offenses and sustains the policies 
underlying our justice system’s constitutional double jeopardy 
protection. 
 
I. THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
 
Freedom from multiple prosecutions or punishments for the same 
offense is enshrined in the Bill of Rights: “[N]or shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb.”
8
 The Supreme Court has held that double jeopardy is a 
fundamental concept of American justice, extending the clause’s 
protections to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
9
 Several 
broad policies underlie the concept of double jeopardy, including 
protecting individuals from the power of the state, promoting 
efficiency in the criminal justice system, and preserving public 
confidence in the legal system.
10
 Although the double jeopardy 
guarantee serves principally as a restraint on the power of courts and 
prosecutors,
11
 double jeopardy is not limited to protecting individual 




A. The Importance of the Constitutional Protection  
Against Double Jeopardy 
 
In Green v. United States, Justice Douglas wrote:  
 
[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be 
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual 
                                                 
8
 U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1, cl. 2. 
9
 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
10
 David S. Rudstein, Retrying the Acquitted in England, Part I: The Exception 
to the Rule Against Double Jeopardy for “New and Compelling Evidence”, 8 SAN 
DIEGO INT'L L.J. 387, 403–18 (2007). 
11
 Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). 
12
 Rudstein, supra note 10, at 408. 
3
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for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to 
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to 
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as 





Justice Douglas’ statement encompasses virtually all of the policy 
values underlying the double jeopardy protection: minimizing the 
strain of trials on defendants; protecting defendants from harassment; 
reducing the risk of wrongful convictions; preserving the right of the 
jury to acquit against the evidence; encouraging efficient 
investigations and prosecutions; conserving legal resources; preserving 
the finality of judgments; and safeguarding the public’s respect and 
confidence in the legal system.
14
 These policies recognize that 
although any trial can be a financial and emotional burden, criminal 
defendants face distinct circumstances from civil defendants that 
warrant constitutional protection: the potential loss of liberty or in 
certain instances, life, and an adversary, the state, with unparalleled 
power and resources.  
By disallowing multiple prosecutions, double jeopardy protects 
individuals from unchecked government power by making it 
impossible for a government actor who disagrees with a verdict to 
retry a defendant to achieve the desired verdict.
15
 This limits the 
possibility that the legal system will be used to harass individuals, 
while also helping to achieve accurate verdicts
16
: When a prosecutor 
tries his case more than once, he has the opportunity to rehearse his 
presentation of the evidence, improving his odds of conviction, despite 
the defendant’s guilt or innocence.
17
 In addition to ensuring more 
                                                 
13
 355 U.S. 184, 187–88 (1957). 
14
 Rudstein, supra note 10, at 404–05. 
15
 United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980). 
16
 Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982). 
17
 See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 518 (1990), overruled by United States 
v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993) (citing examples of this danger: “See, e.g., . . . Ashe v. 
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1196, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970) (the State 
conceded that, after the defendant was acquitted in one trial, the prosecutor did, at a 
4
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accurate verdicts, barring re-presentation of the evidence incentivizes 
police officers and prosecutors to investigate and prosecute more 
diligently and efficiently.
18
 When authorities know they have a single 
chance to convict an individual, they must have compelling evidence 
against an individual before initiating a trial.
19
Such diligence and 
efficiency translates into conservation of public resources, such as 
access to judges and courtrooms.
20
 
The limitation on repeated prosecutions for the same offense 
additionally benefits society by ensuring the continued vitality of the 
jury system and the jury’s power to acquit against the evidence.
21
 Jury 
nullification is an important, albeit controversial, power of our jury 
system that has been called the “conscience of the community.”
22
 Not 
disturbing a jury’s findings impacts two other important social 
interests: upholding the finality of judgments and the efficiency of the 
legal system. In recognizing the finality of an acquittal, the justice 
system provides a predictable means of determining the end of 
litigation, allowing individuals to plan their lives accordingly.
23
 Such 
certainty is so essential to the functioning of society that the corollary 
doctrines of res judicata
24
 and collateral estoppel,
25
 more commonly 
                                                                                                                   
subsequent trial, ‘what every good attorney would do-he refined his presentation in 
light of the turn of events at the first trial’); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 78 
S.Ct. 829, 2 L.Ed.2d 913 (1958) (after an alleged robber was acquitted, the State 
altered its presentation of proof in a subsequent, related trial-calling only the witness 
who had testified most favorably in the first trial-and obtained a conviction)”). 
18






 Susan R. Klein & Katherine P. Chiarello, Successive Prosecutions and 
Compound Criminal Statutes: A Functional Test, 77 TEX. L. REV. 333, 362 (1998). 
22
 Mike Reck, A Community with No Conscience: The Further Reduction of A 
Jury's Right to Nullify in People v. Sanchez, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 285, 285 (1999). 
23
 Rudstein, supra note 10, at 407. 
24
 See 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 463 (“Literally, res judicata means ‘a thing 
adjudged’ and has been more freely translated as ‘a matter decided,’ ‘a thing 
judicially acted upon or decided,’ or ‘a thing or matter settled by judgment.’ Broadly 
speaking, ‘res judicata’ is the generic term for a group of related concepts 
5
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raised in civil cases, are firmly rooted common law principles. Lastly, 
avoiding relitigation conserves resources and such conservation, along 
with certainty in the finality of judgments, helps validate the integrity 
of the justice system in the eyes of the public.  
 
B. The Evolution of Double Jeopardy Case Law 
 
The prohibition against double jeopardy has been interpreted to 
provide three distinct constitutional protections: it bars subsequent 
prosecutions for the same offense after acquittal; it bars subsequent 
prosecutions for the same offense after conviction; and it bars multiple 
punishments for the same offense.
26
 Although the concept of double 
jeopardy may appear to be uncomplicated, courts have struggled to 
define the term “same offense.”
27
 This difficulty may stem from the 
                                                                                                                   
concerning the conclusive effects given final judgments.”(internal citations 
omitted)). 
25
 See 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 487 (“Collateral estoppel or issue 
preclusion is a jurisprudential rule that arises in a subsequent proceeding when an 
issue of ultimate fact has been determined by a valid and final determination in a 
prior proceeding. The terms generally refer to the effect of a prior judgment in 
preventing, foreclosing, limiting, or precluding relitigation of issues that have been 
actually litigated in a previous action, regardless of whether it was based on the same 
cause of action as a second suit. Collateral estoppel recognizes that a determination 
of facts litigated between two parties in a proceeding is binding on those parties in 
all future proceedings and provides that once a party has fought out a matter in 
litigation with the other party, he or she cannot later renew that duel. In other words, 
collateral estoppel or issue preclusion prevents relitigation of an issue between the 
same parties or their privies in any future lawsuit based on a different claim. It 
operates whether the judgment in the first action is in favor of the plaintiff or the 
defendant.”). See also 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 385 (explaining that collateral 
estoppel is incorporated in, but not coextensive with, the doctrine of double 
jeopardy). 
26
 Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498 (1984). 
27
 See Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection Against Successive 
Prosecutions in Complex Criminal Cases: A Model, 25 CONN. L. REV. 95, 97–98 
(1992) (describing the difficulty courts have in defining “same offense” in the 
context of compound statutes such as RICO). See also Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 
508, 522 n.12 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993) 
(noting that the terminology used in defining double jeopardy has been “confused at 
6
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Supreme Court’s inconsistent stance on whether double jeopardy 
principles protect individuals only from overreaching by the executive 
branch, or whether it is a limit on how legislatures may proscribe 
criminal conduct.
28






In Nielsen, a Mormon man living with two women was charged 
with cohabitation and adultery.
31
 Although the defendant started 
cohabitating with the second woman on October 15, 1885, the 
prosecutor charged the cohabitation as occurring from October 15, 
1885 to May 13, 1888, and the adulterous conduct as occurring from 
May 14, 1888 onward.
32
 The Supreme Court held that double jeopardy 
prevented the second prosecution, for adultery, for two reasons. First, 
the underlying conduct in both charges was the same because the 
                                                                                                                   
best.”); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981) (claiming that double 
jeopardy decisional law “is a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to 
challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator”). 
28
 See Klein & Chiarello, supra note 21, at 363–69 (arguing that the Court’s 
inconsistent double jeopardy decisions are a result of the Justices’ disagreement over 
whether the clause binds only prosecutors or lawmakers). 
29
 131 U.S. 176 (1889). 
30
 Contrast the understanding of Nielsen proposed by Justice Scalia, writing for 
the majority, with Justice Souter’s dissent, in United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 
(1993). Justice Scalia states that Nielsen is simply a restatement of the Blockburger 
“same elements” test, because Nielsen’s holding means that “prosecution for a 
greater offense (cohabitation, defined to require proof of adultery) bars prosecution 
for a lesser included offense (adultery).”Dixon, 509 at 705. Justice Souter disagreed 
that the offenses of cohabitation and adultery are lesser and greater offenses; the 
prosecution of which would be barred by Blockburger. Id. at 753–54. He explains 
that Nielsen stands for the proposition that “what may not be successively prosecuted 
is the act constituting the ‘principal ingredient’ of the second offense, if that act has 
already been the subject of the prior prosecution. It is beside the point that the 
subsequent offense is defined to include, in addition to that act, some further element 
uncommon to the first offense (where the first offense also includes an element not 
shared by the second).” Id. at 753. Thus, Justice Souter argues that a person cannot 
be tried a second time for an “act” that is “materially” subsumed within another act 
for which that person has already been convicted, regardless of whether the statutory 
elements are sufficiently different under Blockburger. Id. 
31
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sexual conduct charged in the adultery count was “incident” to the 
cohabitation.
33
 Second, the Court concluded that the prosecutors’ 
arbitrary division of dates resulted in multiple charges of discrete 
offenses for a single course of conduct intended by the legislature to 
be charged as a continuous offense.
34
 If prosecutors could fragment a 
crime that the legislature intended to punish as a continuous course of 
conduct into discrete charges, the Court reasoned, a prosecutor can 
create any number of offenses simply by charging based on a temporal 
subdivision of her choice.
35
 As a result, the prosecutor could charge 
the defendant with cohabitation for each year, month, or week of the 
cohabitation period individually, impermissibly punishing the 
defendant multiple times for the same conduct. 
 
1. The Double Jeopardy Standard—the Blockburger Test 
 
Nielsen was decided in 1889, decades before the Blockburger test 
was established in 1932.
36
 The Blockburger test soon became the 
double jeopardy standard.
37
 Unlike Nielsen, the Blockburger test 
focuses on a strict comparison of statutory elements, not on the 
underlying conduct.
38
 In Blockburger, the Court held that “where the 
same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory 
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two 
offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact 
which the other does not.”
39
 Because of its focus on statutory 
                                                 
33
 Id. at 188–89. 
34




 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
37
 United States v. Hatchett, 245 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2001). See also United 
States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704 (overruling the Grady same conduct test and 
reaffirming Blockburger’s same elements test as having “deep historical roots” and 
“accepted in numerous precedents of this Court.”) 
38
 Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977). 
39
 284 U.S. at 304. 
8
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elements, Blockburger has been called a test of legislative intent,
40
 and 
a “rule of statutory construction.”
41
 
Under Blockburger, it would seem that lesser and greater offenses 
can be charged consecutively because the greater offense always 
requires proof of a fact the lesser offense does not. However, 
successive prosecutions of lesser and greater offenses is prohibited.
42
 
A lesser offense is a crime, the elements of which are completely 
subsumed within a greater offense; the offenses are considered the 
same for double jeopardy purposes because in order to prove the 
greater offense, the state must necessarily prove every element of the 
lesser offense.
43
 The rule regarding lesser and greater offenses was 
already established by the time Nielsen was decided in 1889
44
 and in 
1977, the Court unequivocally affirmed that “the Fifth Amendment 
forbids successive prosecution and cumulative punishment for a 
greater and lesser included offense.”
45
 
While Blockburger’s application appears straightforward, the 
Court soon encountered its limits in cases of subsequent prosecutions. 
The first obstacle to the Blockburger test arises in the context of felony 
murder statutes.
46
 Under a felony murder statute, the state must prove 
                                                 
40
 See Linda Koenig Doris, The Need for Greater Double Jeopardy and Due 
Process Safeguards in RICO Criminal and Civil Actions, 70 CAL. L. REV. 724, 732 
(1982) (arguing that the Court, in recent years, has abandoned Blockburger as a 
constitutional test and has instead used it as “a gauge of legislative intent”). 
41
 Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981). 
42
 Brown, 432 U.S. at 166. 
43
 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining a lesser included 
offense as “[a] crime that is composed of some, but not all, of the elements of a more 
serious crime and that is necessarily committed in carrying out the greater crime . . . 
For double-jeopardy purposes, a lesser included offense is considered the ‘same 
offense’ as the greater offense, so that acquittal or conviction of either offense 
precludes a separate trial for the other.”) 
44
 See Ex Parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 189 (1889). 
45
 Brown, 432 U.S. at 169. 
46
 See Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (holding that “when, as here, 
conviction of a greater crime, murder, cannot be had without conviction of the lesser 
crime, robbery with firearms, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution for the 
lesser crime, after conviction of the greater one.” Id. at 682.). See also Klein & 
9
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that a killing occurred during the commission of a number of 
statutorily enumerated felonies. When a defendant is charged with 
felony murder based on armed robbery, for example, the Blockburger 
test would not bar a subsequent prosecution for armed robbery.
47
 This 
results because the Blockburger test looks only at the statutory 
elements of the statutes at issue; and felony murder statutes normally 
do not require proof of armed robbery per se, but rather require proof 
only of some felony.
48
 Thus, a facial comparison of the statutes does 
not indicate that the offenses are lesser and greater included offenses. 
The Court, however, barred such successive prosecutions because they 
have the practical effect of forcing the defendant to defend against the 
charge of robbery a second time.
49
 
The second Blockburger obstacle is evident in cases in which the 
state attempts to relitigate an issue of fact that has already been 
resolved. In Ashe v. Swenson, a defendant was charged with six 
separate robberies for entering the home of an individual during a 
poker game and robbing each of the game’s participants.
50
 The 
defendant was acquitted by the jury, which found that the prosecution 
did not sufficiently prove the defendant’s identity.
51
 Six weeks later, 
however, the defendant was brought to trial again, for the robbery of 
another participant in the poker game.
52
 The state, in presenting its 
evidence in the second trial, relied on substantially the same witnesses, 
but refined their presentation of the evidence, resulting in a 35-year 
prison term for the defendant.
53
 Under Blockburger, the second 
prosecution would not be barred because the state was required to 
prove that the defendant stole from the victim in the second trial: proof 
                                                                                                                   
Chiarello, supra note 21, at 334 (stating that felony-murder prosecutions are an 
exception to the same elements test). 
47
 Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 528 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), overruled 






 397 U.S. 436 (1970). 
51




 Id. at 439–440. 
10
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of a fact not required in the first prosecution. Relying on the principle 




The third Blockburger obstacle arises in situations similar to 
Nielsen, in which a prosecutor attempts to fragment a single 
continuous course of conduct into multiple convictions. The Court 
addressed the issue of fragmentation in Brown v. Ohio, stating: “The 
Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guarantee that 
prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of 
dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units.”
55
 
Like it did in Nielsen, the Court in Brown suggested that the answer to 
fragmentation lies not in the Blockburger test, but in how a statute 
defines the element of the crime.
56
 
Recognizing these limitations, the Court briefly instituted a “same 
conduct” test in the 1990 case, Grady v. Corbin, but soon after 
overturned it in 1993.
57
 In Corbin, the Court held that a prosecutor 
cannot bring a subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential 
element of the subsequently charged offense, it “will prove conduct 
that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been 
prosecuted.”
58
 In Corbin, Justice Scalia opposed the majority’s new 
“same conduct” test, and argued in part that the drafters’ conscious 
                                                 
54
 Id. at 446. 
55
 Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977). 
56
 See supra, Part I.B., for an explanation of the Nielsen case. The Court, in 
determining whether the fragmentation was permissible, said it must determine if the 
offense is “inherently a continuous offense.” Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 186 
(1889). In Brown, the defendant was caught driving a car he had stolen. He was first 
charged with joyriding, and found guilty, and was later charged with auto theft. The 
defendant had the car in his possession for nine days before he was caught. The State 
argued that the prosecutions did not violate double jeopardy because they each 
focused on “different parts of his 9-day joyride.” Justice Brennan, writing for the 
majority, noted “we would have a different case if the Ohio Legislature had provided 
that joyriding is a separate offense for each day the motor vehicle is operated without 
the owner’s consent.” Brown, 432 U.S. 161, 169, n.8 (1977). 
57
 495 U.S. 508, 522 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 
(1993). 
58
 Id. at 521 (emphasis added).  
11
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choice to use the term “same offense” in the text of the Fifth 
Amendment, as opposed to “same conduct,” supports Blockburger’s 
focus on the statutory definition of the offense, not on the defendant’s 
underlying conduct.
59
 When the Supreme Court reversed Corbin in the 





2. The Totality of Circumstances Test for Conspiracies 
 
Even in light of Blockburger’s limitations, the Supreme Court 
continues to reject a constitutional test based on conduct.
61
 Yet the 
Supreme Court has held that prosecution of a single conspiracy as two 
separate conspiracies violates double jeopardy,
62
 and Blockburger’s 
comparison of elements fails to provide a system for gauging when the 
impermissible fragmentation of an element of the conspiracy has 
occurred. This failure, best illustrated in the Nielsen and Brown cases 
discussed supra, has led the lower federal courts to devise a conduct-
based test applicable in instances of subsequent, overlapping 
conspiracies.
63
 As Nielsen and Brown demonstrated, the Blockburger 
test was incapable of guiding the Court in ascertaining whether 
prosecutors had impermissibly fragmented an element of the offense. 
Rather, the Court necessarily looked to the actual underlying conduct 
and evidence of legislative intent regarding the temporal element of 
the offense to determine whether prosecutors violated double jeopardy 
by arbitrarily fragmenting the offense.
64
 
                                                 
59
 Id. at 522 (Scalia, J., dissenting: “That rule best gives effect to the language 
of the Clause, which protects individuals from being twice put in jeopardy ‘for the 
same offence,’ not for the same conduct or actions. ‘Offence’ was commonly 
understood in 1791 to mean ‘transgression,’ that is, ‘the Violation or Breaking of a 
Law.’ . . . If the same conduct violates two (or more) laws, then each offense may be 
separately prosecuted.”). 
60




 Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 54 (1942). 
63
 Poulin, supra note 27, at 119. 
64
 See supra note 56. 
12
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In dealing with fragmentation, the lower courts have adopted the 
“totality of circumstances” test, a fact-sensitive, contextual approach 
for analyzing double jeopardy in instances of overlapping 
conspiracies.
65
 In determining the constitutionality of subsequent 
prosecutions of overlapping conspiracies, the lower courts have found 
that it is necessary to compare the underlying conduct constituting the 
conspiracies charged.
66
 Although each circuit differs in its articulation 
of the totality of circumstances test, most look at the extent of overlap 
of the following common elements: (1) time period; (2) participants; 
(3) location; (4) overt acts; and (5) defendant’s role in each 
conspiracy.
67
 In the Seventh Circuit, “the court must look to such 
factors as whether they involve the same overt acts, people, places, or 
time period; whether they share similar objectives or modus operandi; 




One scholar describes the test as “protective and conduct-
sensitive.”
69
 By focusing on the conduct that forms the conspiracy 
charge, the court is free to reject the prosecutor’s framing of the 
charges.
70
 The court’s independent analysis of the conduct, in turn, 
makes it less likely that a fragmented conspiracy will be overlooked, 
which results in adequate double jeopardy protection for defendants.
71
 
The totality of circumstances test is useful in analyzing RICO 
conspiracies because two of the statute’s complex elements, enterprise 
and pattern of racketeering activity, are particularly susceptible to 
fragmentation. 
 
                                                 
65






 United States v. Sertich, 95 F.3d 520, 524 (7th Cir. 1996). 
69
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II. THE RICO ACT 
 
The Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 
has been recognized as one of the nation’s broadest laws.
72
 RICO was 
a cog in the massive legislative machinery that Congress created to 
target the “sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity” of 
organized crime leaders, the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.
73
 
RICO was enacted as title IX of the Act, which contains twelve 
distinct laws connected by the common purpose of combating 
organized crime.
74
 The Act’s stated purpose is “to seek the eradication 
of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools 
in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal 
prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies 
to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized 
crime.”
75
 Despite this stated purpose, RICO’s broadly drafted statutory 
language has been interpreted to include a variety of contexts of 
“enterprise criminality” beyond the traditional understanding of 
organized crime.
76
 This expansion, particularly in the civil context, has 




                                                 
72
 See Jeff Atkinson, “Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations,” 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1961–68: Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM. L AND 
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (1978). See also Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a 
Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 661 (1987). 
73
 Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (Statement of 






 See generally Atkinson, supra note 72, at 9–10 (noting that RICO’s 
application in civil litigation has been criticized as beyond the scope of the law’s 
original intent and focus on organized crime).  
77
 G. Robert Blakey was the Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee on Criminal 
Laws and Procedures of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 
1969–70 when the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was processed. See G. 
Robert Blakey, The RICO Racket, NAT’L REV., May 16, 1994, at 61for Blakey’s 
criticism of the expansion on RICO in the controversial case, National Org. for 
Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994). 
14
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A. A Brief Legislative History of RICO and its Policies 
 
When the Organized Crime Control Act was passed in October 
1970, it was the culmination of the federal government’s twenty-year 
long preoccupation with and study of organized crime.
78
 The mafia 
threat was first exposed during the 1950s through the investigative 
work of the Senate’s Special Committee to Investigate Organized 
Crime in Interstate Commerce.
79
 The Committee’s work, which 
included televised Senate hearings chaired by Senator Estes Kefauver, 
was one of the first endeavors to amass data on the Mafia’s activities 
and structure.
80
 The Committee uncovered evidence of organized 
crime's infiltration into legitimate businesses and state and local 
governments.
81
 Soon, this infiltration became the focus of Congress’ 
fight against organized crime.
82 
During the following decade, the President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice (popularly known as the 
Katzenbach Commission) continued to study the problem. The 
Commission struggled with defining organized crime because the 
danger of organized crime seemed to reside in two very different types 
of organizations: the “single Mafia,” the large, highly organized, 
hierarchical Italian crime families; and the “multifarious local 
syndicates,” groups of loosely associated criminals not necessarily 
unified under a single hierarchy.
83
 Eventually, the Commission 
rejected the idea (supported by some law enforcement officials at the 
time) that organized crime was nothing more than a group that 
                                                 
78
 See Michael Vitiello, Has the Supreme Court Really Turned RICO Upside 
Down?: An Examination of Now v. Scheidler, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1223, 
1233 (1995). 
79
 David R. Wade, The Conclusion That a Sinister Conspiracy of Foreign 
Origin Controls Organized Crime: The Influence of Nativism in the Kefauver 




 G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on 




 Lynch, supra note 72, at 669. 
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engaged in certain illicit activities such as gambling, narcotics dealing, 
or loansharking.
84
 The Commission recognized that this approach 
“focus[ed] exclusively on the crime instead of on the organization.”
85
 
Rather, the Commission focused on the organization itself, recognizing 
that organized crime “involves thousands of criminals, working within 
structures as complex as those of any large corporation, subject to laws 
more rigidly enforced than those of legitimate governments.”
86
 
Defining “organized crime” to encompass the Commission’s dual 
concept was a problem that cropped up again when Congress drafted 




Yet the initial version of the bill that would become the Organized 
Crime Control Act, Senate Bill 30 (S. 30), did not contain any of 
RICO’s provisions.
88
 The Organized Crime Control Act drew heavily 
from the Commission Report’s recommendations; significantly, the 
report did not contain any recommendations resembling RICO.
89
 
Senator Roman Hruska introduced two bills in the Senate that included 
the provisions that inspired title IX, the RICO portion of the Act.
90
 The 
first bill, S. 2048, proposed amending the Sherman Antitrust Act to 
prohibit parties from investing or using, in a particular business, 
unreported income from an unrelated line of business.
91
 The second 
                                                 
84
 Id. at 668. 
85
 Id. (quoting the Commission’s Report, President’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Organized Crime 
(1967)). 
86
 Lynch, supra note 72, at 667–668 (quoting the Commission’s Report, 
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The 
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967)). 
87
 A RICO offense does not have to be connected to organized crime. See 
Criminal RICO: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968, A Manual for Federal Prosecutors, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (5th rev. ed. 2009) at 285, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/rico.pdf. 
88
 Lynch, supra note 72, at 671; S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
89
 Lynch, supra note 72, at 672. 
90
 Id. at 673. 
91
 Id. at 673; S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). 
16
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bill, S. 2049, created new civil and criminal penalties for anyone who 
invested income derived from certain criminal activities in a business 
affecting interstate commerce.
92
 Although Senator Hruska’s two 
successive bills both died in the Senate, his efforts at combating the 
“racketeer infiltration of legitimate businesses” did not.
93
 He proposed 
a new bill, detaching the proposals from the antitrust laws and 
combining the provisions.
94
 His new proposal would have 
criminalized the investment of any income derived from any of several 
enumerated federal offenses, or any intentionally unreported income, 
in any business enterprise affecting interstate commerce.
95
 
Hruska eventually joined forces with Senator McClellan, who had 
originally proposed the Organized Crime Control Act in January of 
1969.
96
 They worked together to revise Hruska’s new bill, and 
Hruska’s proposals were once again before the Senate, this time as S. 
1861.
97
 This new bill was later amended and incorporated into S. 30, 
as title IX, the RICO Act.
98
 Senate Bill 30 took 22 months to travel 
through Congress.
99
 It eventually garnered strong support, passing in 
the Senate by a vote of 73 to 1, and in the House by a record vote of 
341 to 26.
100
 Upon signing the popular new law, President Richard 
Nixon remarked that law enforcement would now have the “necessary 




                                                 
92
 Lynch, supra note 72, at 673; S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). 
93






 Blakey, supra note 81. 
97
 Lynch, supra note 72 at 676–680; S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
98
 Lynch, supra note 72 at 676–680; S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
99
 Alan A. Block, The Organized Crime Control Act, 1970: Historical Issues 
and Public Policy, THE PUBLIC HISTORIAN, 39, 39 (Winter, 1980). 
100
 116 Cong. Rec. S462–82(daily ed. Jan. 23, 1970); 116 Cong. Rec. H 9704–
9779 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1970). 
101
 Richard Milhous Nixon, The President's Remarks at the Signing Ceremony 
at the Department of Justice (Oct. 15, 1970), in6 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOCS. 1375 
(Oct. 19, 1970). 
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B. The Structure of the RICO Statute 
 
The RICO statute is codified in §§ 1961 through 1968 of title 18 
of the United States Code.
102
 The statute is structured in a complex, 
multi-layered way. The “core” of the statute, §1962, creates four 
distinct substantive offenses
103
: (1) § 1962(a)
104
 prohibits the 
establishment, acquisition, or control of legitimate or illegitimate 
enterprises funded by illegally obtained resources; (2) Section 
1962(b)
105
 prohibits an individual from illegally maintaining or 
acquiring an interest in, or controlling any enterprise that affects 
interstate commerce; (3) § 1962(c)
106
 prohibits an individual 
associated with an enterprise to participate in its activities through a 
pattern of racketeering activities or collection of unlawful debts; and 
                                                 
102
 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (2006). 
103
 Lynch, supra note 72, at 680. 
104
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(a) provides: It shall be unlawful for any person who 
has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of 
racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person 
has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States 
Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds 
of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, 
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or 
foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of 
investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of 
the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this 
subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his 
immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity 
or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the 
aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not 
confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer. 
105
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(b) provides: It shall be unlawful for any person through 
a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire 
or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which 
is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. 
106
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c) provides: It shall be unlawful for any person 
employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which 
affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or 
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
activity or collection of unlawful debt. 
18
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 the conspiracy component of the statute, prohibits an 




It is impossible to understand RICO without reference to §1961’s 
definitions. Section 1962(c), for example, criminalizes “enterprises” 
that engage in “a pattern of racketeering activities.”
109
 Section 1961 
defines the terms used in §1962, including “racketeering activity,” 
“enterprise” and “pattern of racketeering activity.”
110
 Under § 1961, 
“racketeering activity” is defined broadly as committing two or more 
offenses from a laundry list of over fifty enumerated state and federal 
offenses loosely grouped into seven categories and ranging from 
murder and kidnapping, to fraud and witness tampering.
111
 A “pattern 
                                                 
107
 18 U.S.CA. § 1962(d) provides: It shall be unlawful for any person to 
conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section. 
108
 See Susan W. Brenner, S.C.A.R.F.A.C.E.: A Speculation on Double 
Jeopardy and Compound Criminal Liability, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 915, 932 (1993) 
(explaining that a RICO conspiracy is not merely an agreement to commit the 
predicate offenses listed in §1961, but to commit a RICO offense specifically). 
109
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962 (2006). 
110
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 (2006). 
111
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1) provides: “racketeering activity” means (A) any act 
or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, 
dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical (as 
defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), which is chargeable under 
State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which 
is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: 
Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 
471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from 
interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 
(relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891–894 
(relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1028 (relating to fraud and 
related activity in connection with identification documents), section 1029 (relating 
to fraud and related activity in connection with access devices), section 1084 
(relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail 
fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1344 (relating to financial 
institution fraud), section 1425 (relating to the procurement of citizenship or 
nationalization unlawfully), section 1426 (relating to the reproduction of 
naturalization or citizenship papers), section 1427 (relating to the sale of 
naturalization or citizenship papers), sections 1461–1465 (relating to obscene 
19
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matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to 
obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of 
State or local law enforcement), section 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, 
victim, or an informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, 
victim, or an informant), section 1542 (relating to false statement in application and 
use of passport), section 1543 (relating to forgery or false use of passport), section 
1544 (relating to misuse of passport), section 1546 (relating to fraud and misuse of 
visas, permits, and other documents), sections 1581–1592 (relating to peonage, 
slavery, and trafficking in persons).,1 section 1951 (relating to interference with 
commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 
1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 
(relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the 
prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), section 1956 (relating to the laundering 
of monetary instruments), section 1957 (relating to engaging in monetary 
transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity), section 1958 
(relating to use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-
hire), section 1960 (relating to illegal money transmitters), sections 2251, 2251A, 
2252, and 2260 (relating to sexual exploitation of children), sections 2312 and 2313 
(relating to interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 
2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), section 2318 (relating 
to trafficking in counterfeit labels for phonorecords, computer programs or computer 
program documentation or packaging and copies of motion pictures or other 
audiovisual works), section 2319 (relating to criminal infringement of a copyright), 
section 2319A (relating to unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in sound 
recordings and music videos of live musical performances), section 2320 (relating to 
trafficking in goods or services bearing counterfeit marks), section 2321 (relating to 
trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346 
(relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421–24 (relating to white 
slave traffic), sections 175-178 (relating to biological weapons), sections 229–229F 
(relating to chemical weapons), section 831 (relating to nuclear materials), (C) any 
act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with 
restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating 
to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense involving fraud connected with 
a case under title 11 (except a case under section 157 of this title), fraud in the sale of 
securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, 
buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical (as 
defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), punishable under any law 
of the United States, (E) any act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign 
Transactions Reporting Act, (F) any act which is indictable under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, section 274 (relating to bringing in and harboring certain 
aliens), section 277 (relating to aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter the United 
States), or section 278 (relating to importation of alien for immoral purpose) if the 
20
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of racketeering activity” requires at least two racketeering activities to 
have been committed within the statutory period.
112
 An enterprise 
“includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or 
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in 
fact although not a legal entity.”
113
 Additionally, the Supreme Court 
has held that “enterprise” and “pattern of racketeering activity” are 
distinct elements a prosecutor must prove:  
 
In order to secure a conviction under RICO, the Government 
must prove both the existence of an “enterprise” and the 
connected “pattern of racketeering activity.” The enterprise is 
an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated 
together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of 
conduct. The pattern of racketeering activity is, on the other 




However, because there is often so much overlap between these 
elements, both of which are defined broadly, prosecutors sometimes 
use the same evidence to prove the existence of an enterprise and a 




                                                                                                                   
act indictable under such section of such Act was committed for the purpose of 
financial gain, or (G) any act that is indictable under any provision listed in section 
2332b(g)(5)(B). 
112
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(5): “pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least 
two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of 
this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of 
imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity. 
113
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4). 
114
 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). 
115
 Criminal RICO: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968, A Manual for Federal 
Prosecutors, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (5th rev. ed. 2009) at 66–69, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/rico.pdf 
(explaining the circuit courts’ varying approaches regarding the issue of overlapping 
evidence. In the Seventh Circuit, the enterprise element must be proven 
independently of the pattern of racketeering activity). 
21
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C. RICO Sanctions 
 
In line with the law’s expansive nature, the statute provides for 
both criminal and civil liability.
116
 RICO’s criminal penalties are found 
in § 1963, while civil remedies are articulated in § 1964. RICO’s 
criminal sanctions can include imprisonment, fine, and forfeiture.
117
 
The statute expressly permits life imprisonment
118
 “if the violation is 
based on a racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty 
includes life imprisonment.”
119
 Convictions based on other underlying 
offenses can be punished by a sentence of up to 20 years 
imprisonment.
120
 Section 1963’s forfeiture provisions
121
 allow the 
government to seize a defendant’s “interest in the enterprise connected 
to the offense, and his interests acquired through or proceeds derived 
from racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection. Section 1963 
also permits the government to seek pre-trial and, in some cases, pre-
indictment restraining orders to prevent the dissipation of assets 
subject to forfeiture.”122 
 
D. Exceptions to Double Jeopardy in the RICO Context 
 
Courts have failed to find violations of double jeopardy in several 
scenarios that have a direct impact on RICO prosecutions. These 
“exceptions” to double jeopardy give prosecutors freedom to obtain 
numerous indictments based on a single course of conduct. The dual 
                                                 
116
 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963 for criminal penalties and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964 for 
civil remedies. 
117
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (2006).  
118
 United States v. Flores, 572 F.3d 1254, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009). 
119




 18 U.S.C.A § 1963(a)(1)–(3). 
122
 Criminal RICO: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968, A Manual for Federal 
Prosecutors, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (5th rev. ed. 2009) at 3, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/rico.pdf. 
22
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sovereignty exception to double jeopardy is such an example.
123
 Under 
the dual sovereignty principle, a defendant can be prosecuted for 
identical conspiracy violations, based on the same conduct, if both the 




The dual sovereignty principle was explained in Abbate v. United 
States. In Abbate, the defendants pled guilty and were convicted in 
Illinois for conspiring to destroy the property of another, based on an 
agreement to dynamite telephone company facilities located in 
Mississippi, Tennessee, and Louisiana.
125
 Subsequently, the defendants 
were also indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Mississippi for conspiracy to destroy “property and material 
known as coaxial repeater stations and micro-wave towers,” based on 
the same agreement.
126
 The Court dismissed the double jeopardy 
claim, asserting that the state and federal government each derive their 
power from a different source.
127
 Thus, when each proscribes certain 
behavior, it is “exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other. ‘It 
follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state 
sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and 
may be punished by each.’”
128
 Although Benton v. Maryland, which 
extended Fifth Amendment double jeopardy protections to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment,
129
 had not yet been decided, 
Abbate has never been overruled and the dual sovereignty principle 
has been repeatedly reaffirmed.
130
 Thus, despite being convicted or 
acquitted in a state prosecution, a defendant can face a nearly identical 
                                                 
123
 See George C. Thomas III, RICO Prosecutions and the Double 
Jeopardy/multiple Punishment Problem, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1359, 1405, n.251 
(1984) (discussing cases that applied the dual sovereignty exception to subsequent 
RICO prosecutions). 
124




 Id. at 189. 
127
 Id at194, 196. 
128
 Id. at 194 (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)). 
129
 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
130
 See Poulin, supra note 27, at 150. 
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Likewise, prosecutors can achieve multiple convictions without 
violating double jeopardy by charging a defendant for both a 
conspiracy and the underlying substantive charges. Courts have held 
that punishment for both a RICO conspiracy and substantive offenses 
implements Congress’ desire to enhance the sanctions that are imposed 
on “racketeers.”
132
 Thus, prosecutors have considerable leeway in 
achieving multiple prosecutions of RICO defendants. In states with 
statutes similar to RICO,
133
 the Abbate principle allows federal 
prosecutors to coordinate efforts with state prosecutors to achieve 
consecutive convictions. Additionally, federal prosecutors may 
prosecute defendants for both conspiracy and substantive RICO 
offenses. Lastly, many of the predicate “racketeering” offenses can 
also be punished separately under state law, including, for example, 
acts or threats involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, 
robbery, bribery, and extortion.
134
 These exceptions demonstrate that 
the double jeopardy protection for subsequent prosecutions based on 
the same course of conduct is not absolute and that prosecutors have 
substantial discretion in choosing to cumulatively punish a single 
course of conduct. 
 
                                                 
131
 See generally Doris, supra note 40, at 732 (discussing the Justice 
Department’s recognition of the perils of the sovereignty principle as embodied in 
the Petite Policy. According to the Justice Department’s Petite Policy, no federal 
prosecution should follow a state prosecution for substantially the same act. 
Duplicate prosecutions should only occur with prior approval of an Assistant 
Attorney General if the AAG determines that the federal prosecution will serve 
“compelling interests of federal law enforcement.” The Department asserted that the 
Petite Policy will be observed in RICO cases.). 
132
 Brenner, supra note 107, at 933. 
133
 See Tracy Doherty et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 
31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 769, 826 n. 1 (1994) (noting that “[t]hirty one American 
jurisdictions have enacted ‘little RICO’ or RICO-like statutes that more or less track 
the federal RICO statute. Twenty-nine of these statutes are directed at activity 
similar to that which is the target of the federal RICO statute.”). 
134
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1). 
24
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III. THE SCHIRO DECISION 
 
A. Background Facts and Procedural Posture 
 
The defendants in Schiro, Frank J. Calabrese, Sr., and James 
Marcello, had been members of the “Chicago Outfit,” or “the 
Syndicate” since the 1960s.
135
 The Outfit is a Chicago organized crime 
gang with roots that can be traced to Al Capone.
136
 The Outfit operated 
its illicit activities through an assortment of “street crews,” operating 
in different parts of the city.
137
 In 1993, Marcello was tried and 
convicted under § 1962(d) of the RICO Act, for conspiring to conduct 
the affairs of the “Carlisi street crew,” which was also known as the 
“Melrose Park crew,” through a host of illegal activities.
138
 The 
conspiracy conviction was based on conduct occurring between 1979 
and 1990, and included activities such as extortion, intimidation, and 
conspiracy to commit murder and arson, among other charges.
139
 
Calabrese was indicted in 1995 for his participation in a similar 
conspiracy, occurring between 1978 and 1992, and involving the 
“Calabrese street crew,” which was also known as the “South side” or 
“26th street crew.”
140
 Calabrese pled guilty in 1997 and was sentenced 
to 118 months in prison.
141
 Marcello appealed his conviction to the 




In 2005, Calabrese (who remained in federal custody) and 
Marcello were indicted with new RICO conspiracies, based on 
information from the FBI’s decades-long “Operation Family Secrets” 
                                                 
135 United States v. Calabrese, 490 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2007). 
136 Id. at 577. 
137
 United States v. Schiro, 679 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, No. 
12-5571, 2012 WL 3155138 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2012). 
138
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 The indictment alleged that the two men (along with 
nine other defendants) engaged in racketeering activities for the Outfit, 
whose “criminal activities were carried-out by sub-groups or 
‘crews.’”
144
 Because one of the protections of double jeopardy is 
against a second trial for an offense of which the defendant has 
already been convicted or acquitted, a defendant can move to dismiss 
new charges at the indictment level.
145
 Thus, prior to the beginning of 
the “Family Secrets” trial in 2007, Marcello and Calabrese moved to 
dismiss the indictment based on double jeopardy.
146
  
The district court held that the new indictment did not violate 
double jeopardy and the Seventh Circuit reviewed the decision in 
United States v. Calabrese.
147
 Judge Posner, writing for the majority, 
affirmed the dismissal of Marcello’s and Calabrese’s double jeopardy 
claims.
148
 The Seventh Circuit held that the defendants failed to show 
a sufficient overlap between the current indictment and the previous 
indictment to establish that the new prosecution was placing them in 
double jeopardy.
149
 However, Judge Posner noted that, depending on 
the approach taken at trial by the prosecutors, the double jeopardy 
claim could be vindicated if prosecutors relied on essentially the same 
evidence as in the prior conviction.
150
 
After the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, the 
defendants proceeded to trial in June of 2007. At the end of the trial, a 
jury convicted both Marcello and Calabrese, and both were sentenced 
                                                 
143
 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 14 Defendants Indicted for Alleged 
Organized Crime Activities; “Chicago Outfit” Named as RICO Enterprise in Four-
Decade Conspiracy Alleging 18 Mob Murders and 1 Attempted Murder (April 25, 




 Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 (1977). 
146
 United States v. Schiro, 679 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, No. 
12-5571, 2012 WL 3155138 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2012). 
147
 United States v. Calabrese, 490 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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to life in prison.
151
 The Schiro decision addresses Marcello and 
Calabrese’s appeal of these convictions.
152
 The Seventh Circuit 
rejected the defendants’ argument that their agreement to facilitate 
racketeering activities for the street crews and the Outfit is the same 
conspiracy because the street crews are part of the Outfit, which 
together form a single enterprise.
153
 The court affirmed the trial court’s 
convictions
154
 and the defendants filed a writ of certiorari with the 





B. Judge Posner’s Majority Opinion 
 
In Schiro, the majority held that “[t]he Outfit and its subsidiary 
street crews are different though overlapping enterprises pursuing 
different though overlapping patterns of racketeering. And so they can 
be prosecuted separately without encountering the bar of double 
jeopardy.”
156
 In reaching this conclusion, the court identified the 
difficulty of assessing double jeopardy claims in conspiracy 
prosecutions: a conspiracy statute criminalizes the actual agreement as 
opposed to the acts committed pursuant to the agreement.
157
 Thus, “the 
terms of the agreement rather than the details of implementation” 
determine the conspiracy’s boundaries.
158
 Since a RICO conspiracy is 
an agreement to knowingly facilitate the activities of operators or 
managers of an enterprise that commits racketeering activity, 
agreements with two distinct “enterprises” are separate conspiracies.
159
 
                                                 
151
 Schiro, 679 F.3d at 524-25. 
152
 Id. at 525. 
153
 Id. at 526, 528.  
154
 Id. at 535.  
155
 Schiro v. United States, No. 12-5571, 2012 WL 3155138 (U.S. Oct. 1, 
2012). 
156
 Schiro, 679 F.3d at 526. 
157




 See id. 
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Consequently, the majority cautioned, the Blockburger test, which 
requires a determination of whether two statutes have the same 
elements, did not guide the court’s determination in Schiro.
160
 
The majority, however, failed to enunciate any test that controls 
the determination of the enterprise issue; instead, the crux of its 
decision is Judge Posner’s Ford analogy.
161
 In his analogy, the 
defendants are likened to employees working at Ford Motor 
Company’s River Rouge plant, conspiring to make illegal firearms, 
instead of cars.
162
 At this point in the analogy, the majority explained, 
an employee cannot be charged with successive conspiracies based on 
his work for Ford and the River Rouge plant separately because “the 
members and the objectives and the activities of the two conspiracies 
(conspiracy with employees of Ford, conspiracy with employees at 
River Rouge) would be identical.”
163
 Once the employee is promoted 
to Ford’s corporate headquarters, however, where he engages in 
preparing financial reports to conceal Ford’s illegal profits, “he has 
joined a separate though overlapping conspiracy.”
164
 This promotion 
scenario, the majority contends, is analogous to the defendants’ work 
with the street crews and the Outfit, illustrating that “depending on 
what the employee does, there can be two different enterprises that he 
is assisting rather than one even though they are affiliated.”
165
 Thus, 
because an enterprise member’s activities and objectives determine the 
boundaries of the enterprise, the defendants conspired with two 
enterprises by performing certain distinct activities (namely, murder) 
that were directly linked to the objectives of the Outfit but not to the 
objectives of the street crews. 
Yet, by predicating the enterprise’s boundaries on “what the 
employee does,”
166
 the majority’s analysis conflated two elements, 
                                                 
160
 See id. 
161
 See id. at 526-27. 
162
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enterprise and pattern of racketeering activity, and measured the scope 
of the enterprise by the scope of the conspiracy. The majority accepted 
that the street crews are branches, or “operating divisions” of the 
Outfit.
167
 It also conceded that there was some overlap between the 
activities charged in the previous trial and the current indictments.
168
 It 
concluded, however, that the Outfit is distinct from the street crews 
because it has authority over activities (i.e. murders) that accrue 
benefits unique to the Outfit, whereas the street crews’ operation of 
street-level vice accrues benefits to the entire organization.
169
 The 
majority stated:  
 
All this would be obvious if the Chicago Outfit were a 
corporation and the street crews were subsidiaries. But it 
would be beyond paradoxical if by virtue of being forbidden 
by law to form subsidiaries, employees of criminal 
enterprises obtained broader rights under the double jeopardy 




In concluding its double jeopardy analysis this way, it is evident 
that the majority’s comparison of the Mafia to a corporation was not 
merely illustrative, but policy-driven. 
 
C. Judge Wood’s Dissent 
 
In her dissent, Judge Wood concluded that “the double jeopardy 
violation that [she] feared would occur from this retrial has 
unequivocally occurred. Calabrese and Marcello had each already 
been convicted and imprisoned for their part in the street crews that lie 
at the heart of the Outfit's operation.”
171
 To reach this conclusion, 
Judge Wood analyzed the underlying conduct in each indictment using 
                                                 
167








 Id. at 535 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
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a version of the totality of circumstances test, examining the overlap 
in: (1) the timeframe of the various activities charged; (2) the persons 
involved in the activities charged; (3) which statutes the racketeering 
activities in each charge violated; (4) the nature and scope of the 
activity the government seeks to punish in each charge; and (5) the 
location where the activities charged occurred.
172
 According to Judge 
Wood, when the test’s five factors all point in the same direction, 
courts must find that the pattern of racketeering activity was the same 
and that the conspiracies had the same object.
173
 In her dissent’s 
carefully conducted analysis, this is exactly what she concluded.  
In comparing the indictments, Judge Wood’s analysis showed that 
the government’s new charges against the defendants covered the 
same period of time and the same pattern of racketeering activity as 
the prior charges.
174
 The only difference she discerned between the 
current and prior cases was the wider scope of the recent prosecution, 
which focused on evidence of the Outfit’s commission of murder and 
violence; however, this evidence was also a component of the first 
prosecution and while it is not entirely subsumed in the pattern of 
activities, it is not different enough to change the pattern.
175
 
Judge Wood recognized the difficulties of comparing conspiracies 
because conspiracies have no clearly discernible boundaries with 
regard to time, place, persons, and objectives.
176
 Additionally, she 
recognized that under the RICO statute, the definition of enterprise is 
broad: “a group of persons associated together for a common purpose 
of engaging in a course of conduct.” 
177
 However, Judge Wood, unlike 
the majority, did not conflate enterprise and pattern of racketeering.
178
 
Conspiring with one enterprise to commit a different pattern of 
racketeering, she stated, creates a separate conspiracy, but not a 
                                                 
172




 Id. at 539–41. 
175
 Id. at 540. 
176




 See supra Part III.B. 
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 Because the defendants agreed to the same 
pattern of racketeering activity, and the Outfit and street crews are the 
same enterprise, there is only one conspiracy. She perceived the 
double jeopardy issue as essentially one of fragmentation.
180
 Unlike 
the majority, she concluded that the issue in Schiro required an answer 
to the question: “[U]nder what circumstances [is it] permissible to 
carve multiple ‘enterprises’ out of one group?”
181
 
Judge Wood’s finding that a single enterprise exists is bolstered by 
the weaknesses of the majority’s analogy between the mafia and Ford, 
a legitimate corporate enterprise. First, she addressed the majority’s 
contention that “what the employee does” (or an employee’s 
objectives and activities) determines the boundaries of the enterprise: 
In Judge Wood’s view, each of Ford’s various plants, like the River 
Rouge plant, would not be transformed into separate enterprises by 
virtue of independently manufacturing a different product.
182
 Each 
plant would still be part of Ford; however, Ford would now be a single 
enterprise that makes money through different lines of commerce.
183
 
Thus, although each street crew independently conducted its activities, 




Second, Judge Wood’s dissent rejected the majority’s claim that 
the Outfit’s unique authority to authorize murders distinguished the 
Outfit from the street crews.
185
 The dissent noted that the fact that an 
employee of a subsidiary can exercise discretion in performing certain 
tasks but must receive approval from the parent company for others, 
does not create a separate enterprise; whether the employee must 
follow the orders of his superiors or not, he is still acting for the 
                                                 
179
 See id. at 538. 
180








 See id. at 538. 
185
 Id. at 536–37. 
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benefit of the parent company.
186
 Judge Wood illustrated this point 
using the Ford analogy:  
 
Should the janitorial staff at the River Rouge Complex be 
considered to be conspiring with a different “enterprise” than 
a notional enterprise made up of the assembly line workers? 
What if the sanitation workers required approval from HR 
before they hired a new janitor to join their ranks? Would the 
action of hiring a janitor somehow become associated with 
the “HR-enterprise,” but all other janitorial actions remain 
confined to the “janitor-enterprise”? Nothing in either the 





According to the dissent, the overarching problem with the 
majority’s approach was a matter of application, not theory: an 
examination of the facts in the case, the dissent stated, reveals that the 
work of the street crew and the Outfit was “a single coordinated 
operation.”
188
 The majority erred by concluding that the work of the 
street crews was a different pattern of racketeering activity distinct 
from the work of the Outfit and using this fact to establish distinct 
enterprises.
189
 In Judge Wood’s view, the evidence at trial 
demonstrated that the street crews were not “self-sufficient” 
enterprises that functioned without oversight, like independent 
contractors.
190
 Rather, they were an indispensable and inextricable part 
of the Outfit: “The Street Crews were the mob's hands, the Outfit its 
head. There is no way to divide the two.”
191
 
Judge Wood further noted that two other circuits have recognized 
that lower levels within the hierarchy of a single crime family are 




 Id. at 537. 
188
 Id. at 539. 
189
 See id. at 538. 
190
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components of the same family.
192
 Lastly, she reminded the court that 
double jeopardy ensures that the state will play by the rules, including 
facing the consequences of its choice to prosecute: “One of those 
consequences is refraining from prosecuting the defendant again, for 







The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Schiro constrains the protections 
of double jeopardy. Judge Wood, in analyzing the case through a 
framework that focuses on the prosecution’s charges to determine if 
fragmentation has occurred, gave effect to the double jeopardy clause. 
She understood that judges must examine how prosecutors have 
defined the contours of an element because double jeopardy prohibits 
arbitrary and artificial fragmentation of elements. In critiquing the 
majority’s overly drawn corporate analogy, she stated:  
 
Nothing in either the Double Jeopardy Clause or RICO calls 
for such inconsequential distinctions. Indeed, if the majority's 
view were correct, we would eviscerate any protection the 
Double Jeopardy Clause provides against repeat prosecutions 
for conspiracy; single organizations could be carved into any 





                                                 
192 Id. Notably, both the majority and dissent cite United States v. Langella, a 
case from the Second Circuit, as authority for their conclusions. See United States v. 
Langella, 804 F.2d 185, 189 (2d Cir.1986) (holding that there was no double 
jeopardy because the indictments involved different enterprises: “The Commission 
and the Colombo Family . . . are two separate and independent criminal enterprises. 
Significantly, the Colombo Family is not merely a lower level of authority within the 
hierarchy of organized crime . . . [it] is a self-sufficient enterprise that functions 
without oversight by the Commission.”). 
193
 Id. at 541. 
194
 Id. at 537. 
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When our nation’s founding fathers drafted the Constitution, they 
probably could not have imagined a statute as broad and complex as 
RICO. But Schiro, is not, as the majority suggests, a case about 
“employees of criminal enterprises obtain[ing] broader rights under 
the double jeopardy clause than the employees of legal ones.”
195
 
Simply stated, Schiro is a case about a concept that would have been 
familiar to the drafters: the fragmentation of a single course of conduct 
into multiple convictions by government actors eager for convictions. 
The courts have dealt with this type of prosecutorial zeal since at least 
1889, when the Nielsen case was decided. Nielsen upheld the 
fundamental principle at the heart of the double jeopardy doctrine: 
“[W]here, as in this case, a person has been tried and convicted for a 
crime which has various incidents included in it, he cannot be a second 
time tried for one of those incidents without being twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense.”
196
 Parsing the enterprise element 
arbitrarily, as the majority did in Schiro, sacrifices the clause’s 
protections against prosecutorial overreaching in favor of RICO’s 
remedial purpose. A RICO conspiracy charge is a mighty sword, a 
“broad and powerful tool,”
197
 and so there must be adequate protection 
against its abuse. 
 
                                                 
195
 Schiro, 679 F.3d at 527. 
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 Ex Parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 188 (1889). 
197
 Schiro, 679 F.3d at 537 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
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